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In his recent book, Until Justice and Peace Embrace, Nicholas Wolterstorff claims that in ethics there exist "sustenance rights," also called "positive rights," which demand that people be provided the requirements of productive social living, including food, clothing, shelter, healthful environments, and elementary health care. I defend Wolterstorff's claims against attacks by social theologian Richard John Neuhaus, who argues in effect that to grant sustenance rights implies both personal and theoretical acceptance of an unreasonable obligation which I call the Duty of Sacrifice (DOS) to transfer all one's wealth to meet those needs, a charge which Wolterstorff interprets as a demand that he sell his house.
In his recent work, Until Justice and Peace Embrace, 1 Calvin College philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff explores a variety of issues, including Church social teaching, contemporary global economics and power politics, liberation theology in comparison to Dutch neo-calvinism, epistemology, God's relation to time, and liturgical renewal, among many other topics. I would like here to restrict my remarks to an important and controversial claim that he makes about rights, which has been attacked in a severely critical review article in the journal This World by Lutheran clergyman and social theologian Richard John Neuhaus 2 and defended by Wolterstorff in a lively response to this review published in the Reformed Journal. ' While Neuhaus and Wolterstorff, and other thinkers whom they represent, disagree fundamentally in their understanding of what constitutes a just society and the Christian's role therein, the particular aspect of their disagreement that I would like to examine is Wolterstorff's assertion and Neuhaus's denial of the claim that within morality there exist "sustenance rights," also called positive rights by many theorists, along with the less controversial noninterference, or negative rights.
Wolterstorff argues that we have at least four kinds of rights: rights to protection, from assault for example; rights to freedom, as to free speech; rights to participate in the political proc~ss; and rights to sustenance,4 This latter right to sustenance represents, in Wolterstorff's words, "a claim on our fellow human beings to social arrangements that ensure that we will be adequately sustained in existence,"5 Wolterstorff includes among the goods we are authorized to claim under these rights the following: "food, clothing and shelter that are adequate for sustaining health and making it possible to contribute to society; ... water and air that are not injurious to health, and ... elementary health care."6 In a just society, the provision of such needs at this minimal level for everyone will be vi(wed as a matter of respect for basic human rights. Wolterstorff considers the en1itlement to the necessities of adequate sustenance "among the minimal claims that all of us make on our fellow human beings."
Jf this assertion of sustenance rights is to be more than a mere manifesto, we must be able to specify the sorts of claims that people are entitled to make under these sustenance rights. Such rights share certain characteristics with rights in general. According to Wolterstorff, a right is "(1) ... a morally legitimate claim that (2) the actual enjoyment of that good (3) be socially guaranteed against ordinary, serious, and remediable threats. "7 For Wolterstorff, and for Henry Shue whose book Basic Rights inspires much of his account, a right places real and substantive obligations on others of three kinds: "(1) duties to avoid depriving people of the good in question, (2) duties to help protect them from deprivation, and (3) duties to aid the deprived in the event that deprivation does occur. "R FulJy satisfying the moral claims that rights impose on others requires more than merely refraining from engaging in acts which would constitute violations.
Wolterstorff stresses that to refer to a claim upon a good as a "right" is to imply that the claimant is entitled to the good itself, not merely to a promise or a legal proclamation that affirms one's right to the good. That point can be summarized by saying that any genuine right is a "right to a good," not a "right to a right." Further, and this is important to his account and to my defense of it, to maintain that someone has a right to a good demands that a social guarantee be constructed for the right. A right not to be beaten, injured, raped, or killed place the burden on the social institutions in which the rightholder finds herself to take steps to see to it that she is not beaten, injured, raped, or killed.
So, Wolterstorff adds rights to the basic necessities for human life and action in the world to the less controversial rights to noninterference. Now what is there to object to in all of this, which bears, after all, the pedigree of such a document as the "United Nations Declaration of Human Rights?" The doctrine of sustenance rights is philosophically controversial for reasons we shall investigatt.!, but it is nonetheless surprising to hear Neuhaus refer to Wolterstorff's advocacy of them as a "moral laceration" which is "cruel, but unfortunately not unusual, punishment for ... all of US. "9 What is at issue between the two? Wolterstorff has said that the refusal of "a rich man" to provide sustenance for a person who is starving "violates the starving person's rights as surely and reprehensibly as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer," a conclusion which he expects to make us all "uncomfortable."10 In his response, Neuhaus seems to ignore that Wolterstorff had included all of us among the uneasy rich who fall under the obligation; he had claimed that all of us are rich in "global terms. "11 Neuhaus then concludes that to accept this doctrine of sustenance rights is to commit ourselves to the obligation to use our "power to transfer. .. our personal wealth to starving people-all of it and right now," which presumably a sincere Wolterstorff would already have done. '2 For the purpose of discussion, I would like to construe Neuhaus's concerns as an argument, and then evaluate this Neuhausian argument vis-a-vis Wolterstorff's case for sustenance rights. I will not attempt the entire, formidable effort of giving a complete proof for such rights, but I hope to show that sustenance rights follow from the justifications generally offered for rights in general. Secondly, I suggest that the objections raised to sustenance rights in particular are not convincing.
To begin then, let us call this duty which Neuhaus regards as correlative to sustenance rights the Duty of Sacrifice, or DOS. The DOS, which requires us immediately to give all of our personal wealth to those whose sustenance rights are not being satisfied, is obviously unreasonable as a demand of moral duty, failure at which is to constitute an injustice. Sacrifice perhaps more readily falls into that category often called the supererogatory. So, for any person to fail to meet the DOS cannot be plausibly interpreted as to violate others' rights. Thus, the sustenance rights to which the DOS corresponds must be rejected. In his response to the criticisms in Neuhaus's review, Wolterstorff plausibly interprets Neuhaus as having subjected Wolterstorff to "ridicule for not having sold [his] house in Grand Rapids and sent the money to the starving of the world,"'3 an omission to which Wolterstorff readily admits.
Neuhaus can be interpreted as having set up a dilemma: either we accept the DOS, obligating us to give all of our resources to fulfill the sustenance rights of others, or we must reject that there are sustenance rights at all. Since Wolterstorff has evidently not accepted the DOS in his personal life, he must either tackle the one hom of the dilemma and rectify this situation immediately or else be impaled on the other hom and forfeit his doctrine of sustenance rights. The question of our title greets us: must Wolterstorff sell his house?
The resolution of this question leads us to examine the dilemma I am attributing to Neuhaus. Is there reason to accept it? Well, Neuhaus is in fact in good philosophical company in rejecting sustenance rights for reasons related to those we have attributed to him. A right is thought of as being either negative or positive. If it is negative, it is in Tom Beauchamp's words "a right to hold a belief, to pursue a course of action, or to enjoy a state of affairs without interference," while if it is positive, it is a right "to obtain a good, opportunity, or service."'4 Jan Narveson sees negative rights to imply correlative duties "not to prevent, or interfere with," that to which we are said to have the right, and distinguishes negative and positive rights as the difference between "the right to nonhindrance and the right to help."15 For many philosophers, noninterference or negative rights are relatively uncontroversial, because they safeguard important values at low cost, requiring only that other agents refrain from interference; while sustenance rights demand positive action and thereby encounter theoretical difficulties.
Joel Feinberg argues that although negative rights are genuine, "positive rights" are not, strictly speaking, rights at all, because of the following distinction. Although negative rights impose upon me "duties towards hundreds of millions of people," they being negative, are such that "1 can discharge them all at a stroke by minding my own business."16 Positive rights like those to sustenance are' different. These rights require that actions be taken to insure that they be fulfilled, and to effectively fulfill them requires more than can reasonably be expected. Feinberg argues that while "young orphans may need good upbringings, balanced diets, education, and technical training everywhere in the world," he would not admit them a right to these goods because the scarcity of the goods in question makes it "impossible to provision all who need them. " 17 Feinberg's notion of correlativity of rights and duties implies that there can be no right without a corresponding duty that it is reasonable to expect to see fulfilled, and there now can be no duty that it is at present impossible to fulfill. Duties arise, along with their corresponding rights, when we find ourselves in a position to perform them.
I believe Feinberg to be incorrect in his insistence that sustenance rights pose for us duties too stringent to be performed. To take the "high road" response, so to speak, we could quite well satisfy those corresponding duties if we were to accept the DOS. If we were to sell all of our goods, it would be possible to meet the requirements of the duty that corresponds to the right to sustenance as held by the needy. To take the less strenuous path, I will argue below that the duties imposed by sustenance rights are indeed in our power to fulfill with much more modest sacrifices.
It is not that Feinberg is in any way indifferent to the needy, however. I should mention that he is willing to grant a "special 'manifesto' sense of right" by which natural needs can be seen as potential rights, rights becoming actualized when someone comes into position to grant them. 18 Similarly, Beauchamp argues that "rights are guiding ideals, rather than existing entitlements," and sees the term 'right' as "a commendable or perhaps obligatory target, but not. .. a specific obligation."19 Returning to Wolterstorff, he would not be satisfied with this attenuated and rhetorical sense of sustenance rights, since he clearly requires that a right be more than a promise.
A noted philosopher of rights who takes his stand on the same side of this issue as Wolterstorff is Alan Gewirth, who argues that sustenance rights are genuine entitlements to what purposeful agents need for action. Jan Narveson has raised objections to Gewirth's positive rights thesis that are relevant to Wolterstorff as welU" Narveson charges positive rights with at least two major defects compared to negative, noninterference rights, on the basis of which Narveson denies that there are such sustenance rights. First, Narveson claims that positive rights would conflict with negative rights, since fulfilling positive rights would entail limitations on negative rights. If full negative rights were granted, positive rights would fade away. My right to lounge unhindered on the beach, to use Narveson's example, entails that a drowning person nearby can have no right to my aid, although it would be no doubt good of me to help her.
Problems with negative rights aside, the positive rights thesis is secondly seen to be fraught with a set of internal problems; in Jan Narveson's words, "of course positive rights may give rise to conflicting duties: my duty to help the poor can conflict with my duty to heal the sick"21 or, we may add, with that to shelter my family, or to use an example from Wolterstorff, relieve urban blight with a Calder statue. By contrast, a "pure theory of negative rights" would in no obvious way give rise to such conflicts, since in language echoing Feinberg's, Narveson observes that "in general, at least, negative rights impose duties which can be fulfilled by doing nothing whatever. "22 Narveson's claim that the dubious positive rights would conflict with the more firn1ly grounded negative rights is incomplete as a criticism of positive rights, since even negative rights properly understood impose positive duties that may conflict with one another and with those of positive rights. I will argue this contention below.
Neuhaus's position, at least as we have reconstructed it, is dignified by much good philosophical company. If there are sustenance rights, these would evidently be positive and thus would require more of us than duty can demand. So to affirm the DOS and say that failure to transfer all of our goods to the starving is "morally tantamount to physically assaulting" the poor, as Neuhaus charges Wolterstorff with saying, would go too far. Sustenance rights must then be given up.
Nonetheless, I believe Wolterstorff's endorsement of sustenance rights to be correct. I will make a number of points in his defense, and then conclude with a move I believe is crucial to the defense of sustenance rights, the undermining of the alleged fundamental distinction between positive and negative rights. First, it is perhaps worth noting that Wolterstorff does not claim that the rich man's failure is "morally tantamount" to assault; he says rather that to know of someone who is starving, to "have the power" to alleviate this starvation, and to choose to do nothing is to violate his sustenance rights. 21 The main point of this is to show that alleviating poverty is not a matter of optional charity, but of respecting human rights, and thus is obligatory. Since he never claims, and would in fact deny, that all of morality is reducible to the fulfillment or violation of rights, failure to provide sustenance is not necessarily morally tantamount to assault for him. Failure to help is as much a violation of right, but may nonetheless be morally distinguishable from assault (e.g., it may not be accompanied by morally objectionable attitudes that may be supposed to contribute to the moral odiousness of assault).
Second, there may be a difference in our culpability in violating negative and positive rights. If negative rights are primarily (although not solely) respected by refraining from action, they largely would involve what have been called "perfect obligations," those always in our power to fulfill, and thus involving more blame if violated, than would failure to undertake positive, "imperfect," and perhaps sacrificial actions to respect sustenance rights. If I have assaulted someone, he is clearly the victim of my violation of his right, whereas an unspecified large number of persons are responsible when someone suffers from starvation.
Third, Wolterstorff does have exceptions built into his requirements for fulfilling sustenance rights. In his Reformed Journal response, he claims that he has stated "more of them than the reader would care to hear about now. One has to know about the starvation or aggression, one has to be able to do something about it, one's doing something about it must not override IJther more pressing moral obligations, and so forth."24 I think that all but the last qualification are easy to find in the book, and that last does seem to be an important one. He perhaps meant it to be understood as included in the qualification that the agent must "have the power" to aid. Perhaps we can accept that "having the power" to alleviate suffering involves ability to do so without overriding other important considerations, including keeping a roof over one's family's heads, providing for one's children's education, keeping ellough resources to enable one to perform one's job, supporting one's parish, and so on. Of course, the notion of overriding needs a great deal more specification in order to be of use, and in particular, to protect Wolterstorff's real estate investment.
Fortunately, those who speak of duties to provide others with necessities have found ways to avoid committing themselves to the DOS. Limiting principles have been proposed. Alan Gewirth argues that we are obligated to provide for the needs of others up to the point in which it involves "no comparable cost to" our own needs for action.25 Peter Singer argues for an obligation to provide for human need that makes reference to the principle of beneficence rather than sustenance rights; he would have us sacrifice when necessary "to prevent something bad" up until the level when doing so would involve our "sacrificing anything of comparable significance."26 Since the thing to which we are to compare our sacrifice is others' lack of basic necessities, Singer would have us accept a milder, modified DOS. Even under his stringent requirements we need not give "everything, all at once," as per Neuhaus's requirement, but nonetheless Singer would have us give a great deal of what we have that keeps us above that level of subsistence not presently enjoyed by our would-be recipients.
Wolterstorff is probably closer to Gewirth than to Singer on the extent to which sacrifice is required. As Gewirth recognizes better than Singer, our own lives of action, our own projects, are also worth moral consideration. This point can be developed to help Wolterstorff avoid the DOS horn of Neuhaus's dilemma. The positive rights advocate can insist that it is simply not the case that our one overriding duty is always to fulfill the sustenance rights of the least fortunate. That is an important duty, to be sure, and few of us can claim to have met our requirements in this area. Nonetheless, our lives are more broadly to be characterized by a stewardly concern for meeting the responsibilities of the various vocations to which we are called: parent, scholar, citizen, friend, churchperson, etc. Fulfilling all of these legitimate callings in any sort of balanced way requires trade-offs; I cannot do all I might do in directly aiding the hungry and still keep the rain off of my own family and fulfill my responsibilities to my employer.
I will now turn to my major point on behalf of the sustenance-rights thesis and against its critics, that the alleged sharp distinction between positive and negative rights is not at all clearly delimited, and that if there are any rights at all they must include sustenance rights as well as the more widely recognized rights to liberty and security.
First, whatever justification can be given for so-called negative, or noninterference rights, would also establish the more controversial sustenance, or positive rights. So, to accept noninterference rights commits one in principle to accept sustenance rights. Philosophical accounts of rights, while varied in many respects, generally agree on certain fundamental points. Philosophers such as Richard Wasserstrom, Gregory Vlastos, Joel Feinberg, Thomas E. Hill Jr., E.M. Adams, Herbert Morris, and Alan Gewirth claim that morality contains human rights that apply equally to all persons. Persons have these rights, it is maintained, primarily to guard their freedom, safety, and well-being. These rights are necessary to enable us to "secure, obtain, and enjoy" the goods that we need to live a truly human life, a way of life selected by us in accord with our own values, desires, and interests. To be able to live such a life is seen to be of extremely great value. This is why respect for rights traditionally is seen to be closely connected to respecting human dignity.
If rights are justified by the fact that they secure conditions necessary for living a truly human life, what are these conditions? According to many philosophers, they are liberty, defined as freedom from hinderance as one goes about one's business, and well-being, not having one's person or property interfered with. But it is quite evident that no one could live a truly human life with no re,ources other than restraints on others' assault. Alan Gewirth includes sustenance rights with the other less controversial rights because both sustenance and the other goods alike are necessities for what he tenns "agency," purposeful action in the world as human beings. We can no more fulfill our purposes if we are debilitated by starvation than if we are physically restrained. In his argument, which is too complex to discuss here, any prospective purposeful agent must admit as rights for others the generic requirements for action that she herself needs for her purposeful activity, that is, freedom and well-being, including sustenance. 27 Regardless of which specific justification is used to give philosophical grounding to rights, however, a problem appears for those who wish to support negative rights but deny positive ones. Such philosophers paradoxically endorse a theory of rights based on the role that rights play in securing the ne,:essity for truly human living, while they exclude from the right-protected goods the minimal requirements for living such a life.
fhe second point of alleged difference between the two sorts of rights I would like to undennine is what we may call the "action-restraint distinction." This is the widely held view that noninterference or so-called negative rights require only that we refrain from interference with others' activities. This nicely minimal requirement alone attaches to negative rights, while seemingly staggering duties are borne in the train of positive rights. For this reason, Feinberg, Narveson, and others have been led to deny any positive right to sustenance.
In his response, Wolterstorff alluded to what I take to be the answer to this objection. When chided by Neuhaus for failing to sell his goods in fulfillment of what we have called the DOS, W olterstorff responded by noting that there are other rights he accepts which he also has not gone about satisfying, e.g., he has not joined the Afghan rebels even though he grants that they have a right not to be victims of aggression. Wolterstorff is hinting that since all rights impose duties of nondeprivation, protection, and aid, even so called noninterference rights such as the right not to be assaulted impose positive duties on all. The provision of positive duties to negative rights powerfully eviscerates the distinction between positive and negative rights. Negative rights too call for doing as well as forbearance.
Henry Shue, in the work Basic Rights cited by Wolterstorff, helpfUlly draws attention to the fact that "while it is possible to avoid violating someone's rights to physical security yourself by merely refraining from acting in any of the ways that would constitute violations ... it is impossible to protect anyone's rights to physical security without taking, or making payments toward the taking of, a wide range of positive actions."28 Thus, for security rights to mean anything at all, they will require investment in "police forces; criminal courts; penitentiaries; schools for training police, lawyers, and guards; and taxes to support an enonnous system for the prevention, detection, and punishment of violations of personal security. "29 A great deal of positive action is involved in fulfilling the duties to protect and aid others in their actual enjoyment of the security to which they are said to have a right. An agent scarcely begins by mere nonviolation to fulfill such a paradigmatic example of a negative or noninterference right as that to security.
Related to this we have Feinberg's claim alluded to earlier that there can be no sustenance rights because in practical terms, it is impossible to set up a system that would provide effective guarantees that their claims be satisfied. There can be no right to a minimal standard of health care, for example, because of the impossibility of restructuring the health care delivery systems, globally and nationally, that would be necessary to guarantee that right. I would suggest, however, that negative rights such as that to security fare no better. We have thus far been unable to prevent a great many assaults in our urban areas, and I doubt that there is any practical possibility that we will do a great deal better in the near future. Yet we do not wish to deny that no one really has security rights merely because we are unable to safeguard them; rather we redouble our efforts to fulfill these claims. Both security and sustenance rights call on us to take action to forestall what Wolterstorff called "ordinary, serious, and remediable threats"; we are not to conclude from the fact that we cannot completely satisfy everyone's moral claims that the claims are invalid.
The action-restraint distinction can also be vitiated from the other side. Shue argues, as do Wolterstorff and others, that so-called positive rights to sustenance largely can be satisfied merely by restraint, by ceasing to do certain things we now are doing which deprive the poor of their basic needs. While rights to sustenance do involve positive duties to aid, they also involve a "type of action needed to fulfill them ... [which] is even more difficult to distinguish sharply from the action needed to fulfill security rights, "30 and that is to cease our own threatening of them. In large part, sustenance rights can be satisfied by providing people with means to self-help, or by ceasing to deprive them of such means, as W olterstorff recognizes. Indeed, much of Wolterstorff' s book is documentation of how we in the global economic "core," on his theory, contribute greatly to the poverty of others at the "periphery." Omitting from this discussion the details of the mechanism by which the poor are denied access to what they need, let me merely suggest that the positive right to sustenance is largely satisfied in ways usually seen as characteristic of noninterference rights. While I do not suppose that the sustenance rights thesis is unproblematic, I do hope to have suggested why if there are any rights at all they will include sustenance rights, and that no sharp positive-negative distinction by which sustenance rights are deficient can be sustained.
An additional point: if sustenance rights are not accepted, there is a prominent and well-known philosophical case for a positive duty to help the poor that makes no reference to rights at all. Peter Singer's famous argument in "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" alluded to earlier derives a duty painfully close to the DOS, in fact, from the claim that we have a duty to prevent an evil when we are capable of doing so without sacrificing something of comparable value, and the uncontroversial claim that suffering due to deprivation of basic needs is just such an evil. As suggested earlier, I think that such an argument needs to be corrected by a more fully orbed sense of our moral responsibilities as they relate to vocations and callings, but in any case, it seems that the rights-sceptic is not yet home free.
Must Wolterstorff sell his house, on pain of being forced to give up his theory of sustenance rights? We have said nothing that would bear on the specific level of sacrifice he must actually endue to be faithful to his own view, but I think that it is safe to conclude that he may limit his sacrifice by what is necessary to fulfill such vocational responsibilities as teaching and writing books that are as personally and intellectually challenging as the one we have been discussing.
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